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REVOLUTION AND COUNTERREVOLUTION:
THE SUPREME COURT ON CREDITORS'
REMEDIES
Earl Phillips*
Creditors have more than a dozen prejudgment, no-notice reme-
dies which permit them to seize or encumber a debtor's property
even before the creditor has sued the debtor and recovered a judg-
ment. Moreover, a creditor may take a debtor's property without
giving the debtor prior notice and the opportunity to oppose the
taking in a judicial proceeding. These remedies include repossession
of collateral by the procedure of replevin, the attachment of a defen-
dant's assets at the beginning of a lawsuit by an unsecured plaintiff,
confession of judgment, and the various forms of self-help: for exam-
ple, the right to set off mutual debts, wage assignments, and the
assignment of receivables.
When one considers it, it is extraordinary that a person may take
another's property without giving notice until the deed is done. Yet
these extraordinary remedies are ancient; they have been employed
in England and the United States for centuries.) In the twenties the
Supreme Court affirmed their constitutionality,' and in 1967 it
could be stated that "[a]lthough attachment is a harsh remedy,
because it deprives the debtor of his power of disposition over assets
prior to the judicial ascertainment of his liability, the constitution-
ality of this procedure is firmly established. ' '3 But even as those
words were written, the Supreme Court was about to undo all those
centuries of law.
In 1969, a Wisconsin litigator asserted, along with several other
allegations in which he probably had more confidence, that the
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Secured creditors and property owners have employed the remedy
of replevin for six hundred years. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 78
(1972).
2. In Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett,
277 U.S. 29 (1928); and McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929) (per
curiam), the Supreme Court held that under a variety of circumstances
attachment is a constitutional remedy.
3. S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 180
(1967).
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garnishment of wages at the beginning of a lawsuit without prior
notice and the opportunity for a hearing violated due process. To
everyone's surprise, the Supreme Court agreed. In Sniadach v. Fam-
ily Finance Corp.,' the Court ruled that a creditor may not garnish
a workman's wages until he has given the debtor notice and an
opportunity to contest the garnishment in (at least) a preliminary
hearing of some kind.
The scope of the Sniadach holding was originally unclear. Some
authorities persuasively argued that Sniadach did not outlaw all
prejudgment remedies, but merely invalidated wage garnishment,
and garnishment and attachment of any other kinds of property as
essential to a debtor's day-to-day life as his wages.' But the possibil-
ity that the Court would give Sniadach a limited reading was re-
moved in 1972. In Fuentes v. Shevin and Parham v. Cortese,' the
Court made clear that the Sniadach holding was almost universally
applicable. These decisions laid down the broad principle that, ex-
cept in extraordinary circumstances,7 no private citizen could use
4. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
5. See, e.g., Hawkland, Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages After
Sniadach, 75 CoM. L.J. 5, 7 (1970).
6. These two cases were decided together at 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
7. Id. at 90-92. The Court indicated that if a debtor is, in fact, about
to destroy or conceal disputed goods, the creditor may summarily seize
them. In this extraordinary case, prior notice of the impending reposses-
sion would merely serve to warn the debtor to act quickly to prevent this
recovery, and so the creditor may capture them without prior notice and a
hearing. See id. at 93-94 n.30. The Court also spoke of the case of attach-
ment of goods at the beginning of a lawsuit against a nonresident defen-
dant over whom personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained. In this extraor-
dinary case, attachment is necessary to give the court in rem jurisdiction
over the controversy or the court cannot exercise jurisdiction at all. Here,
a summary attachment is permissible to secure the court's jurisdiction
before the defendant can remove the property from the state and thus
defeat the court's jurisdiction. See id. at 91 n.23; Ownbey v. Morgan, 256
U.S. 94 (1921). It is interesting that the Fuentes Court considered the
mere possibility of removal of property as justifying summary seizure
when the seizure was in aid of a governmental agency-i.e., a court seek-
ing jurisdiction of a case, but thought the possibility of removal or conceal-
ment too remote to justify summary seizure in aid of a "mere" private
creditor when the defendant is a resident over whom the court can exer-
cise personal jurisdiction. At any rate, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
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the courts to summarily seize another's property. In speaking of
extraordinary situations in which summary seizures were constitu-
tionally permissible,' the Supreme Court made clear that the gov-
ernment could still do this: the Internal Revenue Service, for exam-
ple, is not impeded by Fuentes;' nor are the police when they sum-
marily seize a vessel used for unlawful purposes.'" But department
stores, banks, and finance companies were all required to leave a
debtor's assets alone, no matter how many payments he had missed,
or how egregious his default, until the creditor gave notice and the
opportunity for a hearing.
Naturally, debtors-particularly consumers-wielded Sniadach
and Fuentes like the jawbone of an ass; it seemed for a while that
they would lay low the entire rank and file of prejudgment, no-
notice creditors' remedies except, possibly, self-help." Now, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has retreated from the extreme position it
took in Fuentes; indeed, the Court has gone a long way toward
rehabilitating most forms of summary remedies. We are almost
back to where we were in 1972 prior to Fuentes-almost but not
quite.
The Supreme Court's retreat from Fuentes was signalled by its
actions in three cases in May, 1974. The first, Mitchell v. W. T.
U.S. 600 (1974) seems to have done away with the distinction. It holds
that a court may summarily issue a writ of replevin on behalf of a secured
creditor against a resident defendant upon a showing that the defendant
has the power to remove, conceal, or destroy collateral; it is not necessary
to show that the defendant, in fact, intends to do any of these things. See
id. at 605 n.4. Mitchell makes another point, too: even in an extraordinary
situation, a writ of replevin or attachment may be issued only by a
judge-not a clerk of court-after an ex parte hearing in which the plaintiff
makes a clear showing that the case is extraordinary. See id. at 606 n.5.
That is, the plaintiff must show that, prima facie, the defendant has the,
power to destroy, remove, or conceal the goods in question or the creditor's
security interest; or that it is prima facie impossible to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
8. 407 U.S. at 90-92.
9. See id, at 91-92 & n.24; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595-
96 (1931); cf. Lewis v. Sandler, 498 F.2d 395, 397 n.1 (4th Cir. 1974).
10. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
11. For a statement of the law following Sniadach, see Hawkland, The
Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed?, 78 COM. L.J. 245 (1973).
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Grant Co.,' 2 rehabilitated replevin. The second, Spielman-Fond,
Inc. v. Hanson's Inc.,'3 upheld the constitutionality of mechanics'
and materialmen's liens. Finally, in Carmack v. Buckner," the
Court approved a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court to the
effect that cognovits are valid. However, because of the facts of the
case, the Court's action in Carmack is ambiguous, as will be ex-
plained later.
The cumulative effect of these and other Supreme Court actions,
beginning with Sniadach in 1969, may be summarized in this fash-
ion: wage garnishment is out; replevin is in; statutory liens and
other encumberances of a debtor's property which do not disturb the
debtor's possession are acceptable; cognovits and self-help seem
permissible; but the constitutionality of attachment and garnish-
ment of items such as an automobile or a bank account-property
other than wages-is still uncertain.
I. Liens Which Do Not Disturb Possession
A creditor need not give a debtor notice and the opportunity for
a hearing before encumbering property with a lien, as long as the
lien does not deprive the debtor of possession and use of the property
pending a trial. Such is the effect of the Supreme Court's action in
Spielman-Fond. '1
The fourteenth amendment provides that no person shall be
"deprived of property" without due process. 8 According to the fed-
eral district court in Arizona, 7 this means that no person shall be
deprived of the use of property. In Spielman-Fond, that court held
that the fourteenth amendment, despite the Supreme Court's rul-
ings in Sniadach and Fuentes, does not invalidate mechanics' and
materialmen's liens: in both Sniadach and Fuentes the debtor was
prevented from using the property in question-in Sniadach, part
12. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
13. 94 S. Ct. 2596 (1974) (mem.), aff'g [1972-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH POVERTY L. REP. 18,706 (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 1973) (three-judge
court); accord, Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974).
14. 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974), dismissing for want of a substantial federal
question 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973).
15. 94 S. Ct. 2596 (1974) (mem.).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH POVERTY L. REP. 18,706 (D.
Ariz., Sept. 12, 1973) (three-judge court).
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of his wages were withheld from him so he could not spend the
money; in Fuentes, some household goods and a stereo set were
actually seized by the sheriff and removed from the debtor's house.
However, it is possible to place a mechanic's lien or a materialman's
lien on real property without prior notice and a hearing because:
these liens do not interfere with the owner's continued use of the
land.
When a workman or supplier places a lien on realty, the owner's
possession is undisturbed: he can continue to use the property while
the controversy is thrashed out. The only thing he can't very well
do is sell or mortgage the land because of the cloud on his title. But
a cloud on title is not a deprivation of property within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment, said the district court, which con-
cluded that a statutory lien may be placed against real property
without prior notice or a hearing.'"
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. 9
It wrote no opinion, but its affirmance clearly approved the district
court's decision.'
There is no reason to limit Spielman-Fond to statutory liens. Its
rationale would permit creditors to use other prejudgment, no-
notice remedies as long as the creditor merely encumbers the
debtor's property and does nothing more than make a sale or mort-
gage of the property difficult. For example, a plaintiff could begin
a collection suit by an attachment of the defendant's real property,
without prior notice or the opportunity for a hearing. This would not
violate due process because a levy of attachment does not deprive
the defendant of the use of the land;2' the sheriff merely records a
18. Accord, Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974). The
Ruocco court's alternative ruling was that, even though the imposition of
a lien was considered a deprivation of property within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, a summary imposition would nevertheless be con-
sistent with due process under the balancing of interests test announced
in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) to be discussed infra.
Where the deprivation of property is so slight, due process is satisfied by
a subsequent notice and the opportunity for a hearing of the controversy.
See Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 26-27 & n.1 (D.S.D. 1973).
19. 94 S. Ct. at 2596.
20. The Supreme Court's affirmance of a three-judge district court
judgment is controlling precedent for cases involving the same constitu-
tional claims. Doe v. Hodgson, 500 F.2d 1206, 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
21. Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn.
1971).
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notice of levy in the local land office and leaves the defendant in
possession.2 The attachment would give the plaintiff the lien he
needs to secure payment if the collection suit ends in judgment in
his favor, but the lien is constitutional because, while it deprives the
defendant of the power to easily sell the land or mortgage it, it does
not disturb his use of it while the collection suit proceeds.13
II. Judicial Remedies of Secured Creditors
A. Replevin -
After Sniadach, Fuentes, and subsequent decisions by a score of
lower courts2 4 it was generally concluded that all forms of creditors'
remedies were unconstitutional except self-help, and that even self-
help was questionable. But in spite of the doubtful outlook, W.T.
Grant Co. argued that replevin was a constitutional remedy. Amaz-
ingly, the Supreme Court agreed, 21 and, in Mitchell v. WT. Grant
Co.,2" gave new life to replevin, i.e., the repossession of collateral by
a secured creditor pursuant to a court order executed by a peace
officer without giving the debtor prior notice and an opportunity for
a hearing. Different states give this procedure different names," but
whatever the name, it is once again constitutional with this proviso:
to minimize the danger of a wrongful repossession and to otherwise
safeguard the debtor, the replevin process must incorporate features
22. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-279 to -346 (Supp. 1974).
23. See Central Sec. Nat'l Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc., 371 F. Supp.
476, 480 (E.D. Mich. 1974). But see Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l
Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973); Bay State Harness Horse Racing
& Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973);
Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Rogers, summarized at 41 U.S.L.W. 2492 (D.
Idaho Feb. 21, 1973).
24. A representative selection of federal and state cases will be found
in Annot., 18 A.L.R. Fed. 223 (1974) and Annot., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 447 (1973).
25. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 619-20 & n.14 (1974). The
lawyers in Mitchell were probably as surprised as those who successfully
questioned wage garnishment in Sniadach.
26. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
27. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (Supp. 1974); LA. CODE CIV. PRO.
ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961);\ N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7101-11 (McKinney 1963),
as amended, (Supp. 1974); id. § 7112 (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 1821, 1824-47 (1953).
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that serve in lieu of notice and hearing.2 8
It is important to note that the Supreme Court did not overrule
Fuentes.2 Rather than do obvious violence to the principle of stare
decisis by overruling a decision only two years old, 0 the new major-
ity on the Court discerned substantial differences between the
Louisiana statute in Mitchell and the Florida and Pennsylvania
statutes which the Court invalidated in Fuentes." Nevertheless, it
is clear that Mitchell severely limits Fuentes and restores replevin
to sellers with a vendor's lien, lenders with a chattel mortgage, and
other secured creditors, so long as safeguards similar to those found
in the Louisiana statute exist.
What are these safeguards? What distinguishes the replevin pro-
cedures struck down by the Supreme Court in 1972 from the proce-
dure upheld in 1974?
28. These "features" are not traditionally found in the replevin pro-
cess.
29. Consequently, replevin statutes like the statutes held unconstitu-
tional in Fuentes, which afford a debtor none of the procedural safeguards
incorporated in the Louisiana statute, are still unconstitutional. See also
Garcia v. Krausse, summarized at 43 U.S.L.W. 2120 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23,
1974) (procedure for the replevy of collateral by secured creditors unconsti-
tutional because writ issued by clerk of court upon conclusory allegations
of right to possession unsupported by sworn, documentary evidence); Jones
v. Banner Moving & Storage, Inc., 358 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1974). In
addition, it seems that seizures by governmental agencies for a governmen-
tal purpose, e.g., to protect the public good as opposed to aiding a private
creditor, are still governed by Fuentes rather than Mitchell. Thus, sum-
mary seizures by governmental agencies are still limited to extraordinary
cases in which action is urgent, e.g., to protect the public from adulterated
food. To put it another way, the more flexible balancing of interests test
of due process announced in Mitchell may not be used to justify summary
seizure by the police of a vessel used for unlawful purposes. See Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (decided two
days after Mitchell).
30. This implies no adverse criticism of the Mitchell decision, which is
actually a reaffirmance of stare decisis despite the Court's refusal to follow
Fuentes. As already pointed out, Fuentes outlawed a remedy that had been
employed for centuries and did so in the face of previous Supreme Court
decisions upholding its constitutionality. Thus Mitchell repairs the dam-
age done to stare decisis by Fuentes.
31. 416 U.S. at 616.
19741
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Mitchell is premised on the proposition that a secured creditor
has an in rem interest in the collateral which is as deserving of
protection as the debtor's ownership. 2 The due process problem is
to balance these conflicting interests fairly.33 This balance was
achieved in the Louisiana procedure because court clerks, who have
no discretion to evaluate the merits of a request for a writ of re-
plevin, may not issue the writ.34 A secured creditor may obtain a
writ only by initiating a-collection suit;35 even then, he may obtain
a writ only after an ex parte hearing before a judge in which he
produces sworn, documentary evidence establishing a prima facie
case of default by the debtor:3 the creditor must prove to the judge's
satisfaction that a valid debt exists, the creditor has a security
interest, and the debtor has probably missed one or more install-
ments without justification. 31 This minimizes the risk of a wrongful
repossession,3 e.g., repossession when the debtor has not defaulted.
On the other hand, since the hearing is ex parte and the writ is
served on the debtor without prior notice, the creditor is able to
obtain the collateral before further use by the debtor depreciates its
value as security. In addition, summary issuance of the writ permits
the creditor to recover the collateral before the debtor has a chance
to destroy, sell, hide, or take it out of the county.39 However, the
creditor must post a bond in an amount sufficient to pay the debtor
for the compensable injuries he will suffer should it transpire that
the creditor was not entitled to repossess.'"
32. Id. at 603.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 606 n.5.
35. Id. at 606.
36. Id. at 605.
37. Id. at 604-05.
38. Id. at 609-10.
39. Id. at 608.
40. Id. at 606. In Louisiana, a debtor whose property has been wrong-
fully repossessed is entitled not only to damages for the temporary depriva-
tion of his property, but also to damages for injury to his reputation,
humiliation, and his attorney's fees. Id. at 606. There may be states which
do not permit recovery for injury to reputation, humiliation, and attorney's
fees; in these states, the creditor would be required only to post a bond
securing the debtor against wrongful interference with his use of the collat-
eral. However, this alone probably would not render replevin unconstitu-
[Vol. III
CREDITORS' REMEDIES
If the creditor proves a prima facie case and posts the required
bond, the judge may order the collateral summarily repossessed.
This is not the end though. After the collateral is seized by the
sheriff, the debtor must have the immediate right to demand a
second, bilateral preliminary hearing-unless there is a prompt trial
to finally determine the controversy." However, the creditor again
has the burden of clearly showing that the debtor has probably
defaulted on a valid debt,4" although this time the creditor must
overcome any opposing evidence presented by the debtor," e.g., that
he was justified in stopping payment because the creditor had
breached a warranty of merchantability." Moreover, the debtor
tional in these states because Mitchell seems an attempt by the Supreme
Court to restore replevin as it was known in the past, with just enough new
safeguards to enable the Court to distinguish Mitchell from Fuentes.
41. Id. at 606; LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961).
42. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 96-97. See also text accompany-
ing note 41 supra.
43. The kind of hearing required is illustrated by the hearing held in
Long Island Trust Co. v. Porta Aluminum Corp., 44 App. Div. 2d 118, 124,
354 N.Y.S.2d 134, 140 (2d Dep't 1974). This bilateral hearing was held
before the seizure: Mitchell had not yet revealed that it could be postponed
until immediately after the seizure.
44. The Mitchell opinion is unclear on the nature of the hearing which
must immediately follow seizure of collateral. There is a possibility the
decision requires a hearing on the merits-issuing in a final judgment con-
cluding the controversy. But the opinion speaks of a "full hearing on the
matter of possession," 416 U.S. at 610, i.e., a- preliminary hearing on the
collateral issue of who is to have possession pendente lite. The opinion
also speaks of the debtor's right "immediately to seek dissolution of the
writ . . . unless the creditor 'proves the grounds upon which the writ
issued' . . . ." Id. at 606, citing LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West
1961). Article 3506 contemplates a preliminary hearing pending the final
outcome of the collection suit: "The defendant by contradictory motion
may obtain the dissolution of a writ of . . . sequestration [replevin],
unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ was issued. If
the writ . . . is dissolved, the action shall then proceed as if no writ had
been issued." Id. (emphasis added). Garcia v. Krausse, summarized at 43
U.S.L.W. 2120 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 1974) construed Mitchell as requiring
a full hearing on the merits immediately after the seizure. Nonetheless, the
author believes the Supreme Court intended only to require a preliminary
hearing on the question of who shall have possession of the collateral pend-
ing a full hearing on the merits of the collection suit.
1974]
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must be permitted to regain possession of the collateral, if he
chooses, by posting a bond securing payment of the amount claimed
by the creditor. 5 Finally, there must be a prompt adversary hearing
of the creditor's collection suit."e And until the suit is concluded by
a final judgment on the merits, the creditor may not sell or other-
wise dispose of the collateral. 7
A secured creditor has a lien on collateral to the extent of the
unpaid balance. Consequently, the creditor has an interest in
quickly seizing the property, in the event of a default, in order to
prevent deterioration, removal, or other disposition of the property
that would place it beyond the creditor's reach. What is more, credi-
tors want a cheap, i.e., summary, method of recovering collateral in
order to keep down the cost of credit. The debtor, on the other hand,
has an interest in avoiding an arbitrary and unjustified seizure.
In Fuentes, the Supreme Court ignored the creditor's security
interest and ruled that, in the ordinary case, nothing except notice
and the opportunity for a preliminary hearing before the creditor
seizes the collateral could adequately protect the debtor's interest. 8
Indeed, the Court announced an almost absolute principle that,
except in extraordinary situations, a private creditor could never
summarily deprive a debtor of property.
Mitchell introduces a less doctrinaire, more flexible approach-a
balancing of interests test of due process. 0 The Court said, "[T]he
very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible proce-
dures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."', Con-
sequently, Mitchell is by no means the last word; litigation will be
necessary to test the various creditors' remedies on a remedy by
remedy, case by case basis 2 before the new constitutional law of
45. 416 U.S. at 607.
46. Id. at 626-27 (Powell, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 606 n.7; LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3510 (West 1961).
48. 407 U.S. at 80-84.
49. Id. at 82.
50. 416 U.S. at 610. Many courts will find this a congenial approach.
It was used prior to Mitchell in Central Sec. Nat'l Bank v. Royal Homes,
Inc., 371 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mich. 1974); and after Mitchell in Ruocco v.
Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
51. 416 U.S. at 610, citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650
(1972).
52. See Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., summarized at 43 U.S.L.W.
[Vol. III
CREDITORS' REMEDIES
creditors' remedies is finally settled. Nevertheless, it appears that
only a judge may order the summary seizure of a debtor's property
after an examination of sworn evidence in an ex parte hearing analo-
gous to the hearing held on an application for a temporary restrain-
ing order; the days when the clerk of a court could mechanically
order any summary seizure are no doubt over forever. 3 Moreover,
it may be necessary to give the debtor the immediate right to a post-
seizure hearing, in which the creditor has the burden of proving the
grounds upon which the writ was issued."
However, it is probably unnecessary that every prejudgment, no-
notice remedy include all of the safeguards found in the Louisiana
replevin procedure. For instance, it may not always be necessary for
the creditor to post a bond. Shortly after the Mitchell decision the
Supreme Court approved both summary seizure of collateral pur-
suant to a confession of judgment clause in a mortgage, and the
summary execution of the judgment against the mortgaged prop-
erty, although the creditor was not required by state law to post a
bond for the indemnification of the debtor in the event the entry of
judgment was wrongful. 5
On the other hand, the presence of all the safeguards found in the
Louisiana replevin procedure is probably no guarantee of constitu-
tionality. Replevin could violate due process in a particular
case-despite these safeguards-where the results of a seizure are
so terrible that a wrongful repossession must be avoided at all costs.
Thus, Mitchell suggests that a creditor may never summarily de-
prive a debtor of his "basic source of income.""8 The decision indi-
cates 7 that Sniadach8 is still good law. It seems, therefore, that a
debtor's wages may not be garnished summarily because even a
temporary loss of income could drive the typical debtor and his
2183 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1974); Guzman v. Western State Bank,
summarized at 43 U.S.L.W. 2183 (D.N.D. Sept. 25, 1974).
53. But see Guzman v. Western State Bank, summarized at 43
U.S.L.W. 2183 (D.N.D. Sept. 25, 1974).
54. See Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., summarized at 43 U.S.L.W.
2183 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1974).
55. Carmack v. Buckner, 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973), appeal dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question, 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974).
56. 416 U.S. at 610.
57. Id. at 614.
58. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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family to the wall5" and put them in a position of "brutal need." 0
The same could be said of the temporary loss of the means of
earning a living, e.g., a car needed by a salesman to call on custom-
ers. It may be, therefore, that prior notice and the opportunity for
a hearing is the only procedure which will adequately protect a
debtor against a wrongful replevy of collateral he uses to earn a
living.
The issue of hardship could conceivably arise in another way.
Mitchell involved the repossession of a refrigerator, kitchen range,
stereo set, and washing machine. The loss of these items undoubt-
edly involves a degree of hardship-it is rather difficult to feed your
family without a refrigerator and stove. Nevertheless, Mitchell
makes clear that the hardship is not so great as to require prior
notice and a hearing when the creditor can show, ex parte, that he
is probably entitled to get the property back. But suppose the (un-
doubtedly rare) case in which someone buys all of his furnishings
and equipment at one time and then allegedly defaults. Reposses-
sion denudes the consumer's home and leaves him with nothing but
bare floors and empty rooms. That might be too much, a degree of
hardship which a creditor may constitutionially inflict on a debtor
only after giving notice and the opportunity for, at least, a prelimi-
nary, bilateral hearing.'
Another problem might also present itself: what if a creditor's
right to seize the property depends upon issues which do not lend
themselves to documentary proof, but require testimony and cross
examination, e.g., fraud on the part of the debtor? Perhaps then a
judge may not issue a writ after an ex parte hearing in which only
documentary evidence is presented by the creditor.2 If this is the
59. 416 U.S. at 614, citing 395 U.S. at 341-42.
60. Id. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring).
61. Cf. Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage, Inc., 358 N.Y.S. 2d 885, 898
(Sup. Ct. 1974). A landlord evicted a tenant on welfare while she was out
of the city and stored all of her furnishings and possessions in a warehouse.
The court noted the balancing of interests test of due process announced
in Mitchell. It held unconstitutional the warehouseman's lien securing
payment of storage costs because of, among other factors, the extreme
hardship suffered by a person deprived of all her furniture and other house-
hold articles. Id. at 899; accord, Grossman Furniture Co. v. Pierre, 291
A.2d 858 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1972).
62. See Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., summarized at 43 U.S.L.W.
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case, the judge must require that the creditor, seeking to make a
showing of fraud, introduce oral testimony as well as any available
documentary evidence proving the debtor's fraudulent intent. If
there is insufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case, the court
must deny the writ. On the other hand, if there is sufficient evidence
the court may issue the writ, as a court issues a temporary restrain-
ing order, to prevent any fraudulent conduct contemplated by the
debtor. Then, immediately after the seizure, the court must give the
debtor a chance for a bilateral hearing (with testimony and cross
examination), and once again require the creditor to prove a prima
facie case of fraud.
B. Confessions of Judgment In Favor of Secured Creditors
The case of a secured creditor who summarily enters judgment
against a debtor and levies execution on collateral pursuant to a
cognovit is not too different from the case of a secured creditor who
summarily replevies collateral. It follows that summary execution
of a confessed judgmentwould be constitutionally permissible
where the entry of judgment and levy are accompanied by safe-
guards which serve to adequately protect the debtor in lieu of prior
notice and the opportunity for a hearing. And, indeed, it seems that
this is the law. Aside from the fact that the Mitchell rationale will
cover both cases, the Supreme Court, in Carmack v. Buckner,
3
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question" a Louisiana
decision which upheld a confession of judgment statute authorizing
summary seizure of collateral by a secured creditor.
The trouble is, an argument can be made against this analysis of
Carmack.
In Louisiana, when a secured creditor seeks a writ to execute a
confessed judgment (the writ is called an order for seizure and sale),
2183 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1974); Hobbs, Mitchell v. WT. Grant Co.: The
1974 Revised Edition of Consumer Due Process, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 182
(1974).
63. 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974).
64. Id. An appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question
means that every question brought for decision is "so clearly not debatable
and utterly lacking in merit as to require dismissal for want of-substance."
Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 258 (1934) (footnote
omitted); accord, Johnson v. Deerfield, 25 F. Supp. 918, 919 (D. Mass.)
(three-judge court), affd, 306 U.S. 621 (1939).
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the debtor is given three days prior notice of the impending levy on
the collateral. This is accomplished by serving the debtor with a
demand for payment- within three days, to which demand there is
attached the creditor's petition for an order of seizure and sale. If
the debtor takes no action, the collateral is seized after three days.
However, during the three days he may interpose defenses to the
petition for an order of seizure and sale; and if he does, the seizure
must await the outcome of the hearing on these defenses. Alterna-
tively, the debtor may seek an injunction barring the seizure and
sale. Here too, the seizure must await the outcome of the injunction
action. Thus Carmack could be viewed as simply holding that the
enforcement of a confessed judgment is constitutional when the
debtor is given notice of an impending levy and the opportunity to
contest it in a hearing held before the seizure occurs.
There is, however, a more likely analysis. The dissent to the
Louisiana court's decision pointed out that the debtor's opportunity
for a hearing prior to seizure is more theoretical than real. When the
debtor is served with the petition for an order of seizure and sale,
he is not informed of his right to a hearing. He is merely told to pay
the amount demanded by the creditor within three days or lose the
collateral. 5 Thus, in practice the enforcement of cognovits in Louis;-
iana amounts to a summary procedure in which the debtor has no
real right to a hearing in advance of the levy on the collateral.
Consequently, the dismissal by the United States Supreme Court
of the constitutional objections to the procedure, coming just fifteen
days after the Court's Mitchell decision, suggests that secured credi-
tors may summarily enforce confessions of judgment against collat-
eral as long as the enforcement procedure contains, in lieu of prior
notice and hearing, safeguards similar to those which permit se-
cured creditors to summarily replevy collateral.
There is yet another possibility. Carmack involved a confession
of judgment clause contained in a real property mortgage: the col-
lateral was a tract of land. In such cases the levy of execution is
constructive. It is accomplished by serving a notice of seizure on the
debtor and recording the notice; the debtor is not actually dispos-
sessed until after the execution sale; in the meantime, he may de-
mand a hearing to contest the creditor's claim. Since the Court
65. 272 So. 2d at 330; LA. CODE CIv. PRo. ANN. art. 2639 (West 1961).
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disposed of Carmack the same day it affirmed Spielman-Fond, it
can be inferred that constructive levy of execution of a confessed
judgment does not trigger the due process clause, simply because
the levy does not disturb the debtor's possession.
Even so, a levy by a secured creditor which actually dispossesses
the debtor of collateral would seem constitutional under Mitchell.
Once again, the author is led to the conclusion that the summary
enforcement of confessed judgments against collateral by secured
creditors is constitutional, given safeguards adequate to protect the
debtor from a wrongful levy.
Assuming this is correct, what procedures are sufficient to justify
the absence Of prior notice and the opportunity for a hearing?
Mutatis mutandis, they are the same procedures that justify their
absence in a replevin action. Summary entry of a confessed judg-
ment and its execution may be ordered only by a judge-never a
clerk of court"-upon documentary proof of a prima facie"t case of
default. Moreover, the debtor must be entitled to a preliminary
hearing to oppose the seizure of the collateral immediately after the
seizure,18 or to a prompt, full scale hearing of the controversy that
will result in a final judgment disposing of the controversy.
III. Judicial Remedies of Unsecured Creditors
A. Attachment and Garnishment
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court expressly stated that its decision,
involving the right of a secured creditor, did not control "[t]he
question . . .whether a debtor's property may be seized by his
creditors, pendente lite, where they hold no present interest in the
property sought to be seized."" Consequently, the Mitchell decision
sheds little light on the constitutionality of the prejudgment, no-
notice remedies used by unsecured creditors to reach assets owned
outright by their debtors. Still, the decision affords us some hints.
On the one hand, the Court rejected the Fuentes rule that, in the
usual case, due process invariably requires prior notice and the op-
portunity for a hearing before a creditor may seize a debtor's assets.
66. 272 So. 2d at 330.
67. Cf. id.
68. Cf. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 2642 (West Supp. 1971).
69. 416 U.s. at 604.
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Mitchell announced the rule that the constitutionality of creditors'
remedies is determined by balancing the need of creditors for
summary action-i.e., simple, expeditious, and inexpensive collec-
tion procedures- against the danger of unjustified seizures. The
balance can be achieved through safeguards built into a given rem-
edy."0 Summary attachment and garnishment of a defendant's as-
sets at the beginning of a collection suit brought by an unsecured
plaintiff may be constitutional if the order of seizure is, for example,
issued by a judge after an ex parte hearing in which the creditor's
sworn evidence establishes a prima facie case of the defendant's
default; and if the debtor is given the opportunity for a bilateral,
preliminary hearing immediately after the seizure to determine who
shall possess the property pending the final outcome of the lawsuit.
Moreover, Mitchell suggests that the new majority on the Su-
preme Court is less likely to impose its idea of constitutionality on
remedies that have evolved from centuries of interaction between
generations of creditors, debtors, lawyers, judges, and legislators,
who have been as sensitive to the requirements of fairness and due
process as are the present members of the Court.7 That is to say,
the Court may have adopted Justice Frankfurter's doctrine of judi-
cial restraint when it comes to invalidating legislation on the ground
of unconstitutionality. If so, it will uphold the traditional creditors'
remedies employed by unsecured creditors where efforts have been
made to limit summary seizures to the case in which debtors are not
current in their payments and have no defenses to the creditor's
claim. In addition, the Mitchell decision relies," inter alia, on a 1921
case which upheld the constitutionality of a Maine statute permit-
ting an unsecured creditor to begin a collection suit by summarily
attaching real property and corporate shares in which the creditor
previously had no interest.7"
However, an important factor in Mitchell was that the creditor
was a secured creditor; it was the necessity of protecting the credi-
tor's in rem property interest in his collateral that justified its sum-
70. When these safeguards minimize the possibility of a wrongful tak-
ing, prior notice and the opportunity for a hearing may be omitted.
71. 416 U.S. at 618-19 n.13.
72. Id. at 613.




mary repossession. The Court said: "[T]he reality is that both
seller and buyer had current, real interests in the property ....
With this duality in mind, we are convinced that the Louisiana
sequestration [replevin] procedure is not invalid . . . . " Where
that duality is missing it may well be that prior notice and the
opportunity for a hearing are the only procedural safeguards that
will adequately protect debtors from unjustified seizures. 5 In short,
the use of attachment and garnishment by unsecured creditors re-
mains unsettled (except that, of course, the use of garnishment to
reach a defendant's wages is forbidden).
B. Confessions of Judgment-Cognovits
Whatever the constitutionality of attachment and garnishment,
the constitutionality of confessions of judgment in favor of unse-
cured creditors is clear. The Supreme Court has spoken at length
on this remedy. In three cases,"6 the Court has ruled that cognovit
provisions in promissory notes and installment sales contracts are
not inherently bad; i.e., there are circumstances in which cognovit
clauses are constitutionally permissible. The exact circumstances
are unclear, but the Court's decisions suggest that cognovits are
unconstitutional in consumer credit transactions under present
practice because of the take it or leave it basis on which retailers
and loan companies offer to do business with consumers." There-
fore, it seems that creditors will have to change their practice to
some degree if, indeed, they may continue to use confessions of
judgment in consumer transactions at all.
Ordinarily, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, a creditor may not recover a judgment for money against a
debtor and execute on the debtor's assets unless the creditor sues
the debtor and gives notices of the suit. If the debtor does not re-
spond to the notice, the court may enter a "default" judgment
74. 416 U.S. at 604-05 (emphasis added).
75. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., summarized at 43 U.S.L.W. 2183
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1974) limits Mitchell to cases where the creditor has a
security interest in the goods that are seized.
76. Osmond v. Spence, 405 U.S. 971 (1972) (per curiam), vacating and
remanding 327 F.-Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
77. 'See cases cited note 76 supra.
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against him without further ado. But if the debtor denies that he
owes the money, the creditor is forced to trial. No judgment may
be entered against the debtor unless the creditor proves his claim
by the introduction of evidence at the trial. Moreover, the debtor
has the opportunity to prove any defenses he may have, such as
delivery of defective goods. Only when the creditor has proved his
right to the money claimed, and the debtor has failed to establish a
defense, does the court grant judgment for the creditor; and only
then may the creditor execute on, i.e., seize and sell, the debtor's
property to satisfy the judgment.
To recapitulate: due process ordinarily requires a creditor to give
a debtor notice and an opportunity to defend before a judgment is
entered against him and his property seized.
The purpose of a confession of judgment clause-a cognovit-is
to dispense with all this. A confession of judgment authorizes a
court, at the creditor's request, to enter judgment against the debtor
without a lawsuit, without notice that it's going to be entered, with-
out a hearing of the debtor's defenses; and to immediately levy
execution on the debtor's property, also without notice. When a
debtor signs a promissory note or contract containing a confession
of judgment provision he waives all notice and hearing. Thereafter,
if he defaults on a payment, a judgment for the amount supposedly
due can be entered against him immediately at the creditor's re-
quest."8
In three cases the Supreme Court has held that both business
debtors and consumers may constitutionally waive their right to
notice and hearing before judgments are entered against them." A
waiver by either a business or a consumer is constitutional if done
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Conversely, an unknow-
ing, unintelligent, or involuntary waiver is probably unconstitu-
tional.
Creditors can take steps to insure that waivers by their debtors
are knowing and intelligent. But it is uncertain whether they can
assure voluntariness in the case of consumers; that may depend on
factors beyond their control. The crucial question, therefore, which
78. Prior to a sale of the property, however, the debtor is entitled-
under the laws of all states-to a hearing if he wants one.
79. See cases cited note 76 supra.
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the Court has not yet answered, is this: can a waiver by a consumer
ever be sufficiently voluntary to be constitutional?
1. "Knowing" Waiver
A debtor waives his right to notice and a hearing when he consents
to the inclusion of a cognovit provision in the instrument which he
signs.
The debtor gives his consent "knowingly"-i.e., he is aware that
the instrument contains a cognovit provision-when he sees and
reads -it. If he is merely handed something to sign with the explana-
tion that it is the promissory note or contract he must sign to obtain
the credit he wants, and if he signs without knowledge of the content
of the instrument, his consent to the cognovit provision is unknow-
ing. This suggests that the waiver was obtained unfairly and is,
accordingly, unconstitutional and void.
2. "Intelligent" Waiver
Even though a debtor sees and reads the cognovit clause before
he signs the note, he may not understand its meaning and legal
consequences. That is, he may not appreciate that he is giving up
his right to notice and an opportunity to defend before judgment is
entered against him. In that event, his consent, though knowing, is
unintelligent. Once again, the waiver is probably unconstitutional
and void.
3. "Voluntary" Consent
Whether a debtor consents freely to a cognovit depends, inter alia,
upon (1) the relative bargaining power of the creditor and debtor;
(2) whether the cognovit is included in the note as a result of the
give and take of negotiations between the parties; and (3) whether
the creditor provides the debtor with consideration for consenting
to the cognovit.
In one of the cases decided by the Court," the bargaining power
of the parties was equal: the creditor was a manufacturer of refriger-
ation, equipment; the debtor, a large corporation operating refriger-
ated warehouses. The debtor had trouble making the cash payment
for equipment it had purchased. The parties engaged in some hard
bargaining, advised by their respective attorneys, and reached an
80. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
1974]
20 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
agreement under which the purchaser executed a promissory note
calling for twelve monthly installments of $15,498 each with six and
a half percent interest per annum. The note contained no congovit
provision. After the first few installments the purchaser requested
additional time in which to pay. There were more negotiations and
a new agreement was reached. The purchaser executed a new note
containing a cognovit provision, the consequences of which the pur-
chaser fully understood.8 '
As consideration for the cognovit note, the buyer obtained a
longer time in which to pay,. smaller installments, a lower interest
rate, and the extinction of certain mechanics liens. 2
The Supreme Court had no doubt that the purchaser's consent to
the cognovit clause was voluntary. Since the buyer also knew that
the clause was in the note and understood its consequences, the
clause was held constitutional.
4. Waiver by Consumers
Creditors can assure that a consumer waives his rights knowingly
and intelligently. All they need do is tell the consumer about the
cognovit provision in the instrument he is about to sign and explain
its consequences. To prove that they have done so they could give
the explanation both orally and in writing and have the consumer
sign the writing. Nonetheless, the consumer's consent to the cog-
novit provision would be involuntary under present practice.83 The
typical consumer does not have the bargaining power of the credi-
tors with whom he deals. This is especially true of poor and blue-
collar consumers, the very consumers against whom most confessed
judgments are enforced. Therefore, consumers cannot usually nego-
tiate with creditors as to whether a cognovit clause is going to be
included in the note they sign. Creditors offer them a cognovit
agreement on a take it or leave it basis; either accept the cognovit
clause or get no credit. But consumers need the credit and, having
no choice, they sign the cognovit note.
Such a cognovit clause is probably unconstitutional and void be-
81. Id. at 180.
82. Payment was to be in twenty-one monthly installments of $6,891.85
each, at six percent interest; moreover, the seller released some mechanics'
liens it had placed on the purchased equipment. Id.
83. See cases cited note 76 supra.
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cause the waiver of prior notice and hearing is involuntary. There-
fore, unless creditors are willing to change their way of dealing with
consumers, they will probably have to give up confessions of judg-
ment.
5. What Can a Creditor Do?
There is nothing creditors can do to equalize the bargaining power
of their customers. And if the consititutionality of cognovit clauses
depends upon equality, cognovit provisions are hopelessly unconsti-
•tutional in most consumer transactions. Nor is it likely that credi-
tors will begin to negotiate terms with consumers merely to insure
the constitutionality of those cognovit clauses the creditor is able to
obtain. We are not going to convert retail stores an~d finance compa-
nies into oriental bazaars where extensive haggling over terms and
conditions is the practice.
But equality of bargaining power and negotiation are relevant
only as evidence that the debtor has freely accepted the cognovit
clause and has not been forced to do so to obtain the credit he needs.
Voluntariness is what counts. Suppose, therefore, creditors were to
offer consumers a choice: either one contract containing a cognovit
clause, but with a relatively low interest rate; or another contract
without a cognovit provision, but with a higher interest rate. If the
creditor then chooses the cognovit agreement, has he not done so
voluntarily? It would seem that he has, assuming, of course, that he
fully understands the differences in the two contracts Offered.
It is probably along these lines that creditors should begin to
think if they wish to continue using confessions of judgment.
This by no means disposes of the use of cognovits by unsecured
creditors. As explained, the relaxation of the due process require-
ment of notice and hearing announced in Mitchell may be limited
to the use of summary remedies by secured creditors against collat-
eral. In that event, Fuentes still controls the judicial remedies of
unsecured creditors, including cognovits. There is a degree of incon-
sistency between Fuentes and the three cases in which the Supreme
Court ruled that debtors may waive their right to prior notice and
the opportunity for a hearing by confessing judgment in favor of
unsecured creditors (as long as the waiver is knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary). Fuentes holds that unsecured creditors may not
summarily seize a debtor's property in the absence of a valid waiver
of prior notice and hearing. It therefore raises this question: when
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may a debtor obtain a hearing on the issue of whether he agreed to
a cognovit knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily?
Some lower courts have adopted this approach: Under Fuentes,
a creditor with a cognovit must give the debtor notice and the oppor-
tunity for a bilateral hearing before a judgment may be entered and
execution levied; but the only issue that may be raised in this hear-
ing is the validity of the cognovit. The creditor is not required to
prove a prime facie case of default and the debtor may not argue,
for instance, that the creditor delivered defective goods. However,
the creditor must notify the debtor of the impending entry of judg-
ment so that he may request a bilateral hearing to show that the
cognovit is void because he did not know the cognovit clause was in
the instrument he signed, or because he had not understood what
it meant, or had not agreed to it voluntarily."4
What happens should the debtor fail to demand or appear at a
hearing? Some courts would still hold an ex parte hearing and re-
quire proof of the probable validity of the confession of judgment.
These courts would not enter judgment against the debtor and order
execution unless the creditor proved to the court's satisfaction that
the debtor had most likely agreed to the cognovit knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily. 5 Other courts might not require a hearing
if the debtor does not demand and participate in one.m In such a
situation they would summarily enter judgment and order execu-
tion, as requested by the creditor.
The courts are divided on the question of who must prove what
when the debtor demands and appears at the hearing preceding
entry of the confessed judgment. One court held that the burden of
proving probable validity of a cognovit is on the creditor, and would
not enter judgment unless the creditor's evidence clearly indicated
that the debtor had voluntarily accepted the cognovit after its
meaning was explained to him. 7 But another court believed that the
84. Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp.
1203, 1206-07 (D.V.I. 1973); Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124, 127 (D.
Del. 1972). In Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
a three-judge district court implicitly charged the creditor with proving
that a waiver was valid.
85. 359 F. Supp. at 127.
86. Cf. 407 U.S. at 82.
87. 314 F. Supp. at 1100.
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creditor was entitled to entry of judgment unless the debtor could
prove invalidity; i.e., the burden of proof is on the debtor. 8 It noted,
however, that a debtor could easily carry this burden by proving
that he had no lawyer when he entered the credit transaction; and
that, in the absence of professional advice, he had not understood
the complicated cognovit clause, filled with esoteric legal terms,'
even though it was read to him. Which is the correct view? Mitchell
suggests the former, indicating that, in a repossession case, the bur-
den of proof must be placed on the creditor in both the pre-seizure
ex parte hearing and in the post-seizure bilateral hearing.89
To repeat: an unsecured creditor who wishes to enter a confessed
judgment against a debtor may have to give the debtor prior notice
and the opportunity for a hearing on the single issue of the validity
of the cognovit. If the creditor is unable to prove, prima facie, that
the debtor agreed to the cognovit knowingly, intelligently, and vol-
untarily, the court will refuse to enter or enforce the confessed judg-
ment. Thus, there will be no seizure of the debtor's assets. In this
event, the creditor is forced to initiate a full scale collection suit,
although this was exactly what the cognovit was supposed to avoid.
If the creditor proves that the cognovit is prima facie valid (or the
debtor does not request a hearing at this stage), the court may enter
judgment and order levy of execution on the debtor's assets. At this
point the debtor may demand a full scale hearing on his alleged
default, e.g., by motion or by initiating an action to enjoin an execu-
tion sale. 0 If he does not make timely demand for this'hearing, the
creditor may sell at execution the property upon which the sheriff
levied. If timely demand is made and a full scale trial promptly
held, the controversy is quickly and finally settled. If the hearing
ends in favor of the creditor, he may proceed to sell at execution the
assets previously levied upon. If the debtor prevails, the judgment
and levy of execution are vacated, the property returned to the
debtor, and the creditor resumes the collection of installments as
they fall due.
When the debtor demands a full scale hearing which cannot
promptly occur, Mitchell suggests that he may demand an immedi-
ate preliminary hearing to determine who shall have possession,
88. 358 F. Supp. at 1207.
89. 416 U.S. at 605-06.
90. This is true in all states.
19741
24 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
pedente lite, of the assets levied on, i.e., whether he has prima facie
defaulted on a valid debt. If this hearing is not demanded, the
sheriff may retain possession, pedente lite, of the property he levied
on. He may also retain possession if the hearing is demanded and
the creditor proves a prima facie case of default. But in the absence
of such proof, the levy must be vacated and the property returned
to the debtor pending the final hearing on the alleged default."
This procedure sounds complicated, expensive, and time consum-
ing. It is. But it is not as bad as it sounds. In most cases the debtor
has in fact defaulted, and the money claimed by the creditor really
is due and owing. Sensing that they cannot succeed, and that their
confessions of judgment are valid, most business debtors will de-
mand no hearing at any stage. They will submit to summary entry
and execution of the judgment they have confessed.
What creditors have to fear is that cognovits are presently invalid
in consumer credit transactions because they amount to contracts
of adhesion, and that many consumers will successfully raise the
issue in the initial, pre-seizure hearing which, it seems, Fuentes
requires. Then the creditor has no choice but to initiate a full scale
collection suit. But if creditors can devise cognovits which are valid,
consumers, like business debtors, are going to permit summary
entry and execution of confessed judgments when they realize the
creditor's claim is well founded. Thus, careful, conscientious credi-
tors could continue to use cognovits much as they have in the past.
IV. Self-Help Remedies
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court stated that the decision "will not
affect recent cases dealing with garnishment or summary self-help
remedies of secured creditors or landlords."9 Since there are cases
which hold that self-help is constitutional and others that hold it is
not, the Court seems to be saying that Mitchell does not decide the
question of self-help.
However, one of the reasons given by the Court in upholding
replevin pursuant to a court order was that judicial supervision of
repossessions afforded the debtor a degree of protection absent in
the case of self-help repossession. Thus, self-help could conceivably
be unconstitutional because of the absence of judicial supervision
91. 416 U.S. at 601-07.
92. Id. at 620 n.14.
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and consequent inadequate protection of the debtor. 3 But this argu-
ment is not persuasive.
For one thing, statutes regulating the various forms of self-help
surround the debtor with all kinds of protection. 4 These safeguards
would seem sufficient to adequately protect a debtor against wrong-
ful seizures of property even though the seizure is not preceded by
notice and hearing. In self-help, the state does not lend to the credi-
tor the awesome powers of coercion possessed by the government,
its courts, and peace officers; hence, in cases of self-help, the debtor
does not need the same kind and degree of protection as, for exam-
ple, in the case of replevin. 1
Moreover, where the creditor acts without the aid of a court or
sheriff the "state action" necessary to trigger the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment seems to be absent. Nor is the necess-
ity for "state" action a mere technicality. As two astute commenta-
tors noted:
Underlying our basic constitutional system is the philosophical tenet that one
of the most important functions of our federal and state governments-and
one of the fundamental reasons for limiting their activity [by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments]-is to preserve the personal
freedom of the individual. The fourteenth amendment is itself an affirmation
93. See Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage Inc., 358 N.Y.S.2d 885
(Sup. Ct. 1974), in which a warehouseman's lien was found unconstitu-
tional because it was enforced by the private actions of the warehouseman
without judicial supervision. The court relied upon Mitchell. Id. at 897.
This is one of the issues raised in Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492
F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov. 11,
1974).
94. For example, section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code au-
thorizes repossession of collateral only in the event of default. Moreover,
even when the debtor has defaulted, a repossession must not involve a
breach of the peace. If a creditor wrongfully repossesses collateral from a
debtor not in default and resells the collateral, the sale is a breach of
section 9-504; the debtor may sue the creditor for the value of the collateral
in a court action or he may recover the generous damages authorized by
section 9-507(1). If the debtor acts before a resale, he may prevent a sale
as well as collect damages. Mojica v. Automatic Employees Credit Union,
363 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Ill. 1973), vacated and remanded for lack of juris-
diction sub nom. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 43
U.S.L.W. 4025 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1974).
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of that tenet in its establishment of protections to prevent state governments
from arbitrarily and unjustifiably interfering with individual liberties. It is
at the heart of the American libertarian tradition that the individual be given
wide rein in structuring his relationships with other individuals .... 1*
It would be ironic, indeed, should the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, designed to protect us from arbitrary governmental restric-
tions, eventually restrain everyone but the government. Yet, ulti-
mately, that would be the state of affairs if the self-help remedies
of creditors are finally ruled unconstitutional. The Internal Revenue
Service could continue to seize the assets of alleged tax delinquents
without prior notice or a hearing despite the fifth amendment's
declaration that the federal government shall not deprive persons of
property without due process of law. State banking authorities
could seize allegedly insolvent banks without notice or a hearing
despite the fourteenth amendment's prohibition of state action
without due process. But an auto dealer or finance company could
not summarily repossess an automobile from a consumer who has
defaulted; banks could not exercise their right of set-off; nor could
assignees of receivables summarily demand that account debtors
pay them instead of the assignor-all because the courts had used
the due process clause to structure the relation between private
creditors and debtors.
Happily, this world-turned-upside down will probably never
exist. Six of the eleven United States courts of appeals have held
that a secured creditor may, acting on his own without the aid of a
court or sheriff, constitutionally repossess an automobile from a
buyer who has allegedly defaulted. Since, in the view of these
courts, the state (and its agencies) do not participate in the repos-
session, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment simply
does not apply. If the fourteenth amendment is inapplicable, a cred-
95. Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors'
Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003,
1016 (1973) (emphasis added). The view that individuals should be given
the widest possible rein in structuring their relations with others, without
undue interference by the courts, seems very nearly the view adopted by
the Supreme Court in Mitchell. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
But see Yudof, Reflections on Private Repossession, Public Policy and the




itor may obviously seize collateral without giving the buyer prior
notice of the opportunity for a hearing. The Supreme Court has
denied certiorari in four of these cases.9
Several courts of appeals have ruled that other kinds of self-help
remedies-the banker's right of set-off, wage assignments, and as-
signments of receivables-are also constitutional despite the ab-
sence of prior notice and a hearing. The Supreme Court has also
denied certiorari in two of these cases." However, the Second Cir-
cuit has held garagemen's liens unconstitutional,98 and the Fifth
Circuit has ruled against the landlord's lien."
As far as the presence or absense of state action is concerned,
there is no difference between one form of self-help and another. If
self-help repossessions, wage assignments, assignments of receiva-
bles, and set-offs are constitutional, so are garagemen's liens and
landlord's liens (when they are privately enforced by garagemen and
landlords rather than by a sheriff).'"' The weight of present author-
96. Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v.
Titleman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493
F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974);
James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d-206 (5th Cir. 1974); Brantley v. Union Bank &
Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S. Nov. 25, 1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales,
Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov. 11,
1974); Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet Co., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974);
Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); Adams v.
Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974).
97. Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974) (wage assign-
ment); Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W.
3200 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974) (wage assignment); Bichel Optical Labs. Inc. v.
Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973) (banker's right of set-
off and assignment of accounts receivable).
98. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.
1973).
99. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
100. In some states a landlord's lien is enforced by a peace officer such
as a constable or sheriff; the peace officer is the one who enters the tenant's
premises and seizes his personal property for the payment of back rent. In
such cases, the lien is more like attachment and garnishment than any
other remedy, and its constitutionality should be decided accordingly.
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ity certainly supports the constitutionality of these remedies despite
the fact that they involve the seizure or retention of a debtor's
property without prior notice or the opportunity for a hearing. In the
author's opinion, the Supreme Court will agree, when it finally de-
cides the question.
Where has all this led us? To this: wage garnishments are out;
statutory, attachment, garnishment, and other liens that do not
deprive the debtor of possession pending a final resolution of the
controversy are in; so are replevin and cognovits when used by se-
cured creditors to reach collateral; cognovits may also be used by
unsecured creditors; self-help seems to be acceptable, but attach-
ment and garnishment of property other than wages by unsecured
creditors are up for grabs.
V. Conclusion
The fuel that has powered our legal engine for the past twenty
years is the ideal of perfectibility-the concept that perfection in
every detail of legal proceedings is necessary for justice.'0 ' The
United States Supreme Court has noticeably applied the concept in
the field of criminal justice,10 but in 1969 it turned its attention to
creditors' remedies, and overturned centuries of careful evolution.
The ideal of perfection implies universal conformity to an abso-
lute standard of excellence.0 3 Thus, in the case of creditors' reme-
dies, the Court ruled that private persons may almost never seize a
debtor's property without first giving the debtor notice and the op-
portunity to contest the seizure in a court hearing,'0 ' unless the
debtor has voluntarily waived notice and a hearing, fully under-
standing what it is he is waiving.' 5
But surely, this is all to the good! Can anyone argue that legal
101. M. FLEMING, THE PRICE OP PERFECT JUSTICE 3 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as FLEMING].
102. Id. passim.
103. Id. at 4.
104. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
105. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See also
Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); Osmond v. Spence, 405 U.S. 971




proceedings need not conform in every detail to an ideal of perfec-
tion discerned by a majority of the Supreme Court? Indeed, one can
do just that.
The vindication of abstract and subjective notions of procedural
due process is not the business of the courts. To insist that justice
invariably requires notice and the opportunity for a hearing in every
conceivable case in which a creditor reaches out for a debtor's prop-
erty is mere "ideological tinkering with state law"'' 6 in the absence
of any showing that the traditional creditors' remedies have, in fact,
caused injustice. Justice in particular cases, not procedural perfec-
tion, is the business of the courts. Moreover, the evidence indicates
that justice, by and large, has been done despite the ability of a
creditor to seize a debtor's property in certain cases without prior
notice and a hearing.107 "For those [debtors] who make an earnest
effort to maintain their payment schedules and default due to cir-
cumstances beyond their control, creditors have traditionally exer-
cised considerable flexibility and have exhausted every reasonable
alternative before resorting to the drastic and expensive remedy of
repossession."'' 08 In Fuentes, the very case in which the Supreme
Court outlawed replevin, it was either admitted or found as a fact
that four of the five debtors were in default and had received several
notices of delinquency but had still failed to pay. 09 No injustice was
done in their cases by the summary seizure of collateral by their
creditors. Since justice had been done, and the creditors had every
right to repossess, the Court should have left their cases alone.
What is more, the judiciary should not decide economic and social
policy; in a democracy, that is best left to the political process. The
rare exceptions involve extreme cases of demonstrated injustice that
is widespread, i.e., racial discrimination. If debtors and their cham-
pions wish the abolition of the traditional creditors' remedies, but
cannot convince a majority of voters and legislators, that should end
106. 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
107. White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay
Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 503, 526-29.
108. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub
nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974).
109. 407 U.S. at 101 n.* (White, J., dissenting). The trial court did not
determine whether the fifth debtor had defaulted.
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the matter."0 There is nothing more undemocratic than the reversal
by the fiat of four or five members of the Supreme Court of a policy
adopted by a state legislature after extensive consultation with in-
terested and knowledgable parties."' Yet that is precisely what the
Court did (by majority of four of the seven Justices participating)
when it held, in Fuentes, that replevin violated due process. As Mr.
Justice White wrote:
The procedure that the Court strikes down is not some barbaric hangover
from bygone days. The respective rights of the parties in secured transactions
have undergone the most intensive analysis in recent years. The Uniform
Commercial Code, which now so pervasively governs the subject matter with
which it deals, [permits secured creditors to repossess collateral in the event
of default either by self-help or replevin]. Recent studies have suggested no
changes in [the Code] in this respect. See Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code, Review Committee for Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, Final Report, §9-503 (April 25, 1971). I am content
to rest on the judgment of those who have wrestled with these problems so
long and often and upon the judgment of the legislatures that have consid-
ered and so recently adopted provisions that contemplate precisely what has
happened in these cases."'
Courts should leave social, economic, and political questions to
the people's legislators because the quality of judicial legislation is
poor.
[Courts] are accustomed to working with ideas, phrases, and words rather
than with people, organizations, and things; and they possess the occupa-
tional weaknesses of those who deal with problems secondhand ...
110. Which is not to say that efforts to change the law of creditor's
remedies are always frustrated. For example, the Wisconsin Consumer
Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 425.101-.401 (West 1974), is a hybrid resulting
from grafting the UCCC to the National Consumer Act promulgated by the
National Consumer Law Center of Boston College. (The Center has since
been separated from Boston College.) Among other things, the Wisconsin
Act severely limits the waiver of defenses against assignees and places
restrictions on creditors' remedies. See generally Holbrook & Bugge,
Creditor's Responsibilities and Duties Under The WCA, 46 Wis. B. BULL.
37 (Feb. 1973); Stute, An Overview of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, id. at
9. Moreover, the National Commission on Consumer Finance has recom-
mended similar changes in its report. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN.,
CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 32-39 (1972).
111. FLEMING 158-59. See also id. at 114-20.
112. 407 U.S. 67, 103 (White, J., dissenting).
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CREDITORS' REMEDIES
[T]hey are out of touch with many aspects of contemporary life ...
[L]egislatures are better equipped, better informed, possess greater sensitiv-
ity, and exercise a broader vision in making new law than do the courts.",
Of course, not everyone agrees with these observations. But it
appears that the present Supreme Court may agree, at least to an
extent, in the area of creditors' remedies. The Court's disposition
last May of Mitchell, Spielman-Fond, and Carmack indicates that
it will no longer insist that creditors' remedies conform to a Platonic
ideal of universal application. It seems to have adopted an Aristo-
telian approach by which it will individually evaluate each credi-
tor's remedy on a pragmatic, empirical basis to insure substantial
justice in the concrete cases before the Court. What is more, it seems
that the present Court is more likely to defer to the judgment of the
people's legislators-a judgment based on a weighing of the benefits
and burdens of their constituents."' If this is so, creditors' remedies
which inflict no injustice on debtors in general or upon a particular
debtor in a given case will pass constitutional muster despite the
absence of prior notice and the opportunity for a hearing.
113. FLEMING 119-20.
114. Even so, the Mitchell decision is anexample of judicial legislation
insofar as it construes the Constitution as mandating procedural details
such as the necessity of filing a complaint in a collection suit to obtain a
writ of replevin, an ex parte hearing prior to issuance of the writ, and a
preliminary hearing afterwards. The Court would have done better had it
completely overruled Fuentes as bad law and left it to state legislatures to
prescribe the details of replevin.
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